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Abstract—This paper proposes an approach for comparing
interlocked board networks over time to test for statistically
significant change. In addition to contributing to the conversation
about whether the Mizruchi hypothesis (that a disintegration
of power is occurring within the corporate elite) holds or not,
we propose novel methods to handle a longitudinal investigation
of a series of social networks where the nodes undergo a
few modifications at each time point. Methodologically, our
contribution is two-fold: we extend a Bayesian model hereto
applied to compare two time periods to a longer time period,
and we define and employ the concept of a hull of a sequence
of social networks, which makes it possible to circumvent the
problem of changing nodes over time.
Index Terms—interlock boards; longitudinal social networks;
Mizruchi hypothesis; hull of a sequence of social networks;
Bayesian analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite [1],
Mizruchi makes the claim that a disintegration of power is
occurring within the corporate elite. He asserts that since
World War II the voice of the American corporate elite has
diminished to the point where it is now ineffectual. This shift
in the role of the corporate elite has had an impact not only on
the corporations it oversees but on the entire business system
[2], [3].
We argue that if this is occurring then there should be
evidence of such change in the power networks of members of
the corporate elite. One way in which to identify the corporate
elite is to look at corporate boards of directors. Building on
the work of Mills [4], extensive research about the power elite
has been conducted, including investigations of the influence
of board members on issues related to executive compensation
and firm performance. Wong et al. [5] show that the level of
board interlocking contributes to the level of executive pay.
In this paper, we focus on interlocked boards - boards that
share at least one director. A premise to our study is to consider
the density of an interlock network as a proxy for cohesive
power within the corporate elite.
Employing a Bayesian analysis in which we test for signifi-
cance in network change over time, we show that there is little
evidence that degradation in the cohesiveness of the network
is occurring within the elite of the elite. We use the Dow Jones
30 (DOW 30) group of corporations to represent the “elite of
the elite” and our period of study is 2001-2010 (Section III).
This result suggests that the Dow Jones 30 forms a very robust
core which is rather impervious to degradation from outside
forces.
We thus demonstrate how to apply a Bayesian model to bet-
ter understand changes over time in an interlocked corporate
board network. This work builds on the Bayesian version of
the p1 model introduced by Wong [6], extended by Gill and
Swartz [7], and applied by Adams et al. [8] to changes in the
density of collaborative networks over two periods of time.
This extended p1 model includes random effects allowing for
some network internal dependency (see also Goldenberg et al.
[9] for a useful review paper).
In this paper, we report on successive pairwise comparisons
of the networks (Section IV) and then propose in Section V a
method to perform a full longitudinal analysis.
II. LITERATURE AND BACKGROUND
In The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills [4] discusses the
structural changes occurring within the United States in the
1930’s and 1940’s that gave rise to the power elite. He
identifies three changes that make this rise in power possible:
1. the increasing dominance of corporations, 2. the expansion
of the federal government, and 3. the emergence of a large
military body following World War II. However, Mizruchi, in
many articles but most visibly in [1], argues that while the
corporate elite was prominent in helping to direct the public
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agenda through World War II, its voice has since that time
become fragmented and has lost its power.
Researchers often use interlocked board membership as the
identifying characteristic to represent the corporate elite. It has
been argued that members of interlocked boards are able to
move in and out of not only board rooms but also of civic
arenas to spread their beliefs. Their board prominence also
gives them the recognition to be seen as senior statesmen in
their communities.
This “inner circle” thus possesses a higher level of political
influence and social cohesion [3]. This implication has led
to the realization that corporations do not exist in isolation,
but instead are part of a societal power establishment through
individuals including interlocked board members [10].
Another interesting question is of whether a core corporate
group such as the Dow Jones constitutes a “rich club” in the
sense described for example in [11]. This would imply that
corporations within the Dow Jones interlock with each other
more than with corporations outside the Dow Jones.
The similarities of powers obtained by the corporate elite
are not the only similarities. Others [12], [13] have shown
that demographic similarities can be observed within these
members as well. They found that, when considering education
and social characteristics, interlocked members have become
more similar over time. One might therefore expect that these
elite members will express similar opinions regarding societal
directions, in turn helping to contribute to the singular voice
of the elite.
In the United States, the most important initiative under-
taken to limit interlocks is the Clayton Act of 1914 which
prohibits U.S. firms that compete with one another from
sharing board members.
Board member turnover is low, with the average board
member tenure being approximately 12 years [14]. Because of
this we don’t expect to see significant change in the interlocked
network on a year-by-year basis. However, we would not be
surprised if events related to the Clayton Act, as described
above, could result in periods of disruption in the interlock
network.
In this paper, we investigate interlock networks under the
lens of Social Network Analysis (SNA). A link occurs between
corporations when they share a board member, or between
directors where they serve on the same board. Such a network
is often referred to as a bipartite network.
III. DATA AND PROPOSED MODEL
A. Data Preparation
ver the 128-year history of the Dow Jones Industrial Av-
erage the companies that make up the index have changed
53 times. The index started in 1884 with 12 companies. This
list expanded to 20 companies in 1916 and expanded again
in 1928 to include a total of 30 companies, where it stands
today. Our period of interest is from 2001 through 2010 which
included 43 total companies, due to additions and subtractions
over this period. We will return in Section V to a discussion
of this group, which we will refer to as the hull of the DOW
30.
Having identified these 43 companies, our next step was
to filter the list of directors down to just those directors who
served on the boards of these companies. This allowed us to
condense all of the directors of interest into a single file.
The data were obtained from the BoardEX database, which
provides a row for each director who overlapped with another
director in the same firm for some period of time (the overlap
period). A new row would be created if either director changed
positions within the firm, or changed director roles. The
overlap period was difficult to work with, and had to be
segmented into a start and end date. Eventually we were able
to get the file down to a unique list of directors for each firm
during only the period of interest.
Figure 1. Interlocked network showing interlocked board members, 2001
From this list we were able to create our nodes and edges.
We started by creating nodes for both the companies as well
as the directors and creating the edges between them. This
allowed us to see demographics on specific directors (age,
gender, tenure, role, etc.) which opened the way for us to
manually spot check our data using director lists found in the
annual reports of these companies. We had to rely on these
demographics instead of board member names due to the lack
of names in the BoardEX database. Our network, at this stage,
can be seen for 2001 in Figure 1, with the nodes sized on the
basis on their degree centrality (note that we have displayed all
30 companies regardless of whether they had a shared board
member, but we have filtered out board members that were
not considered interlocked to keep the graph as easy to read as
possible). We recall that the graph in Figure 1 is a bipartite, or
2-mode, graph since it contains two types of nodes, companies
and directors.
Figure 2. DOW 30 interlocked boards’ network 2001; colors of nodes
represent weighted degree
Next, in Figure 2, we have stripped out the individual board
members and have replaced them with weighted connections
between the two companies, which converts our 2-mode
network into a 1-mode network. So, as can be seen in Figure
2, General Electric (GE) and Microsoft have one common
board member so an edge with a weight of 1 was created
between GE and Microsoft, while GE and Home Depot share
two board members which resulted in an edge with a weight
of 2 between GE and Home Depot. The 2001 network for the
DOW 30 companies can be seen in Figure 2.
B. Proposed model
Following a model suggested by Wong [6] and Gill and
Swartz [7], we employ a Bayesian methodology in a search
for statistical significance in the changes in density of social
networks over time. Testing for statistical significance over
time has been of interest to the social network research
community due to the complexities faced, including link
dependency. In addition to link dependency, snapshots of the
network over time are typically also dependent and, therefore,
traditional means that require independent observations cannot
be employed. The model can be described as follows: Y kij1 = 1
and Y kij0 = 0, if i and j are connected, and Y
k
ij1 = 0 and
Y kij0 = 1, if i and j are not connected, with
lnP (Y kij0 = 1) = λ
k
ij ,
and
lnP (Y kij1 = 1) = λ
k
ij + θ
k + αki + α
k
j .
The index k denotes the time period and indices i and j refer
to two corporations. Because each pair of corporations (i, j)
can either share or not share a board member, the matrix
Y kij0 is a simple opposite of the matrix Y
k
ij1 in the sense
that Y kij0 can be obtained from Y
k
ij1 by replacing zeros with
ones and ones with zeros. The matrix Y kij1 is often referred
to as the sociomatrix, with its ones indicating where a link
occurs. The probability P (Y kij1 = 1) represents the probability
of an interlock link occurring between corporations i and j,
at time k ,and P (Y kij0 = 1) represents the probability that
no such link exists. The parameter θk represents the overall
propensity for links to occur in the network at time k, and the
parameters αki represent the propensity for corporation i to
share board members with other corporations in the network.
Prior distributions are defined on each parameter, making the
model Bayesian.
The advantage of this approach to modelling links in a
sequence of networks is that it allows for links to not be
independent (via the random effects αki ) at a given point
in time and also allows, via suitable priors, for parameters to
exhibit a timewise correlation: for example, it is quite likely
that the θk and the αki are correlated over time. We will return
to this point in Section V.
In Adams et al. [8] this approach was used successfully
to examine changes in network parameters over two time
periods. In this paper we explain how to extend this approach
to more than two time periods, with a more complicated time
correlation structure, such as autoregressive, for example. We
have implemented the Bayesian model for the two time periods
2001 and 2002, and for each successive pair-wise comparison
(2002-2003, 2003-2004, etc.) as well as 2001-2010 (Section
IV) and conducted a preliminary time series analysis in Section
V.
Our DOW 30 components change over time, which presents
a unique challenge to modeling the network. We have several
years of stability where the same 30 companies are present,
but in other years some companies are replaced with others.
Over the 10 year period under study the following changes
occurred:
1) In 2004 AT&T Corporation, Eastman Kodak, and In-
ternational Paper were all removed while American
International Group Inc, Pfizer, and Verizon were added.
2) In 2008 Altria, American International Group, and Hon-
eywell were replaced with Bank of America, Chevron,
and Kraft Foods.
3) In 2009 Citigroup and General Motors were replaced
with Cisco Systems and Travelers.
It follows that we can compare years within each group 2001-
2003, 2004-2007, and 2009-2010, but comparisons across
these time periods may present a challenge.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Table I provides key network level measures for 2001-2010
and Figure 3 graphically displays the evolution of the density
of the networks. It is clear that observed network measures at
first sight remain essentially stable over the period of interest.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
# Nodes 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
# Edges 46 46 48 51 47 46 48 44 40 50
Avg Degree 3.067 3.067 3.2 3.4 3.133 3.067 3.2 2.933 2.667 3.333
Avg Weighted Degree 3.933 3.867 3.867 4.067 3.533 3.533 3.467 3.2 2.8 3.667
Network Diameter 7 7 5 5 5 6 5 6 7 5
Graph Density 0.106 0.106 0.11 0.117 0.108 0.106 0.11 0.101 0.092 0.115
Modularity 0.497 0.478 0.437 0.441 0.402 0.454 0.433 0.529 0.465 0.447
Connected Components 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 1 3 3
Avg Clustering Coefficient 0.226 0.169 0.324 0.336 0.168 0.212 0.197 0.292 0.263 0.235
Avg Path Length 3.071 2.934 2.584 2.495 2.54 2.845 2.645 3.062 3.114 2.514
Table I
KEY NETWORK LEVEL MEASURES DOW-30, 2001-2010
Figure 3. Interlock network density, 2001-2010
One might note a slight disintegration effect in 2008 and 2009,
near the time of highest intensity of the recent financial crisis.
Focusing, for example, on the pair comparison between
2001 and 2002, we can visually observe few differences
between the two network graphs for 2001 and 2002 in Figures
4 and 5.
Figure 4. DOW 30 interlock network 2001
We next employ our Bayesian model to investigate whether
our visual observations are confirmed by an examination of the
posterior distribution of the difference in cohesiveness between
2001 and 2002, and then between all other successive pairs of
Figure 5. DOW 30 interlock network 2002
years, ending in 2009-2010.
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Figure 6. Kernel posterior densities for the difference between 2001 and 2002
in propensities to form links and for the correlation in network parameters
between 2001 and 2002.
Figure 6 displays graphs of the kernel posterior densities for
the difference in the propensity to form links (cohesiveness,
playing here is the role of density) in the networks for 2001
and 2002, and for the correlation of the network parameters
between 2001 and 2002. Since the value of zero is in the
middle of the posterior distribution for the difference, that
would imply no significant change between the cohesiveness
of the 2001 and 2002 networks. It also appears, as expected,
that the correlation is high, with a posterior distribution
centered tightly above .9.
The posterior mean of the difference between 2001 and
2002 is .01548, with a 2.5% - 97.5% credible interval of (-
0.3584, 0.3923) encompassing zero. The positive value of the
posterior mean of the difference indicates a decrease in the
cohesiveness of the network between 2001 and 2002, but this
difference is a posteriori essentially as likely to be positive as
to be negative. A more pronounced difference would have its
posterior density shifted away from zero.
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Figure 7. Kernel posterior densities for the difference between 2002 and 2003
in propensities to form links and for the correlation in network parameters
between 2001 and 2002.
The posterior mean of the difference between 2002 and
2003 of -.1224 indicates an increase in the cohesiveness of
the network between 2001 and 2002, but with a 2.5% - 97.5%
credible interval of (-0.7454, 0.3104) again encompassing
zero.
A similar situation emerges among the remaining pairwise
comparisons, including the comparison of 2001 with 2010
(beginning and end of studied period). The posterior densities
vary a bit in how central zero is to the distribution, but overall,
one does not detect any changes that might be referred to as
significant in a statistical sense.
On the basis of our analysis to date we see no trend away
from interlocked networks over the time period studied. So
while we do not find support for Mizruchi’s claim, we feel
the time period needs to be expanded to get a true sense of
the network changes over decades.
V. EXTENDED DOW JONES AND LONGITUDINAL
INTERLOCK NETWORK
As discussed earlier, one complication in longitudinal inves-
tigations of the DOW 30 network is that corporations leave and
enter this network as years pass.
We therefore propose to employ a DOW 30 hull which
includes all corporations that have appeared at least once
in DOW 30 during the period of study (43 corporations for
the period 2001-2010). We construct a network on this hull
consisting of all links connecting corporations in the hull who
at any stage shared a director. All directors, serving at any
stage on boards of corporations featured in the hull, are nodes
in the bipartite network. We suggest that this is an appropriate
way to identify a corporate “elite of elite” which is somewhat
more robust than the DOW 30 strictly defined.
This makes it possible to build longitudinal models of
networks with a fixed set of nodes, and to compare and extend
existing techniques. As a first foray into the temporal behavior
of the series of networks, we extract the estimated differences
(posterior means) from each of the pairs 2001-2002, 2003-
2004, . . . 2009-2010 and fit a simple AR(2) (Auto-Regressive
of order 2) model to the time series of the 9 differences. The
fit of this preliminarily model is displayed in Figure 8. It is
interesting to note that observation 8 is the pair 2008-2009
when the financial crisis was probably at its most severe level.
Figure 8. AR(2) model on the nine estimated pair differences
The AR(2) model does a fairly good job of explaining
correlations across the years (the root mean square error
RMSE is of .115 and BIC of -3.59 for the AR(2) model,
compared to a RMSE of .135 and a BIC of -3.51 for an
AR(1) model), but we believe that more sophisticated models
constructed on the DOW 30 hull will reveal more aspects of
the evolution of the core interlock network over time. We are
also aware that our current study period is limited, and expect
to extend this period to a much longer time span; from World
War II to the present.
Using the hull of the sequence of DOW 30 interlock
networks, we also expect to be able to take into account in
our model the weights of the links (related to the number of
shared board members).
VI. IN CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed an approach that can be employed
to compare interlocked board networks over time to test for
statistical significant change. Our preliminary findings suggest
that change within the network does not usually occur rapidly
enough to be detected in a year-over-year comparison. This is
not surprising given the size of the network (number of nodes)
and the frequency with which directors for any company
change in a year over year basis. This does not mean that
no shocks have caused changes over the years, but we have
just not yet detected them in our analysis to date.
While we were not surprised to not find significant change
on a year to year basis, we were surprised that even our 10
year analysis (2001 versus 2010) also displayed no significant
change. This suggests that the entire decade was stable. Since
Mizruchi claims that this fracturing has been occurring since
World War II, our next step is to expand the analysis to go back
decades in order to see when this change may have occurred.
In addition to contributing to the conversation on whether
the Mizruchi hypothesis holds or not, we have proposed novel
methods to handle a longitudinal investigation of a sequence of
social networks where the nodes undergo a few modifications
at each time point. Methodologically, our contribution is two-
fold: we extend a Bayesian model hereto applied to compare
two time periods to a longer time period, and we define
and employ the concept of a hull of a sequence of social
networks, which makes it possible to circumvent the problem
of changing nodes over time.
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